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Abstract
In this paper the impact of product market uncertainty on the opti-
mal replacement timing of a production facility is studied. The existing
production facility can be replaced by a technologically more advanced
and thus more cost-eﬀective one. Strategic interactions among the ﬁrms
competing in the product market are taken into account by analyzing the
problem in a duopolistic setting. We calculate the value of each ﬁrm and
showthat i) a preemptive (simultaneous) replacement occurs when the
associated sunk cost is low(high), ii) despite the preemption eﬀect uncer-
tainty always raises the expected time to replace, and iii) the relationship
between the probability of optimal replacement within a given time inter-
val and uncertainty is decreasing for long time intervals and humped for
short time intervals. Furthermore it is shown that result ii) carries over
to the case where ﬁrms have to decide about starting production rather
than about replacing existing facilities.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Present value of growth opportunities often constitutes a signiﬁcant part of
a ﬁrm’s value. Fama and French [5] estimate that on average 42% of the corpo-
rate value in mid-1990s can be attributed to growth opportunities. Translated
into dollars, this means that the average listed US ﬁrm holds a $410 million
portfolio of growth options. Consequently, proper management of such a port-
folio via an appropriately designed capital budgeting process becomes crucial
for maximizing shareholder value and satisfying return-on-capital requirements.
The extensive process of deregulation taking place in the last decade,
combined with the wave of mergers and acquisitions, has resulted in an oligopolis-
tic structure of a large number of sectors. A shift towards such a structure takes
place not only in traditional regulated markets (telecommunications, energy,
transportation) but also in more competitive industries (fast-moving consumer
goods, car manufacturing, pharmaceuticals). Consequently, models designed
for optimizing capital budgeting decisions while ignoring competitors or under
perfect competition may cease to be valid. Imperfect competition in the ﬁrm’s
product market requires that strategic interactions with other ﬁrm(s) are taken
into account (cf. Zingales [25]).
Furthermore, the volatile economic environment that ﬁrms face these
days calls for an appropriate identiﬁcation of the sources of uncertainty under-
lying their real activities. Therefore, there is considerable scope for a structural
modeling of the product market, where the relationship between the uncertain
factor and the cash ﬂow of the ﬁrm is explicitly accounted for.
Keeping these considerations in mind, in the paper we address a number
of issues, which we relate to the problem of production facility replacement with
a more cost-eﬀective one. The questions we endeavor to answer are as follows:
• What is the impact of strategic interactions on optimal capital budgeting
strategies?
• How does the demand level that triggers the optimal replacement depend
on uncertainty, and on the fact whether the ﬁrm is the market leader, has
the role of the follower, or acts identically as its competitor?
• How does demand uncertainty aﬀect the optimal threshold corresponding
to new market entry?
• Is the relationship between the uncertainty and probability of optimal
replacement monotonic?
• What are the implications of uncertainty and strategic interactions on the
value of the ﬁrm?
We consider a continuous-time model in which the ﬁrm makes an in-
vestment decision under product market uncertainty and imperfect competition.
The model followsSmets [20] and Grenadier [7] in assuming that i) there are
two identical ﬁrms competing in the product market, and ii) the value of the
2ﬁrm depends on the value of a stochastic process but is otherwise time indepen-
dent. The payoﬀ functions are derived from the ﬁrm’s reaction curves in the
oligopolistic market.1 Moreover, we calculate the expected replacement timing
and determine the probabilities of making optimal replacement within given
time intervals.
Under either perfect competition or monopolistic market structure, mod-
ern theory of investment under uncertainty (cf. McDonald and Siegel [15], Dixit
and Pindyck [4], Ch. 2) predicts that the ﬁrm will wait with investing for a
higher level of demand if uncertainty is higher. This is due to the fact that
investment is irreversible and the ﬁrm has an option to postpone it until some
uncertainty is resolved. However, if (i) more than one ﬁrm holds the investment
opportunity, and (ii) the ﬁrm’s investment decision directly inﬂuences payoﬀs
of its competitor(s), opposite eﬀects with respect to the investment timing can
arise. First, increasing uncertainty enhances the value of the option to wait.
Second, the value of an early strategic investment (made in order to achieve
the ﬁrst mover advantage) can signiﬁcantly increase as well. Huisman and Kort
[10] show that in a continuous-time duopoly model with proﬁt uncertainty (cf.
Smets [20] and Grenadier [7]) the eﬀect of a change in value of the option to
wait on the optimal investment threshold is always stronger than the impact
of strategic interactions. This implies a negative relationship between uncer-
tainty of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt ﬂow and investment. On the contrary, Kulatilaka and
Perotti [13] ﬁnd that product market uncertainty may, in some cases, stimulate
investment. The latter authors analyze a two-period setting in which (one of
the) duopolistic ﬁrms can invest in a cost-reducing technology. The payoﬀ from
investment is convex in the size of the demand since an increase of demand has
a more-than-proportional eﬀect on the realized duopolistic proﬁts (ﬁrms are re-
sponding to higher demand by increasing both output and price). Taking into
account Jensen’s inequality, Kulatilaka and Perotti [13] conclude that higher
volatility of the product market can accelerate investment.2
We begin the analysis by describing the equilibrium strategies that oc-
cur in the considered real option game. We show that, contrary to the models
based on proﬁt uncertainty, the type of equilibrium depends on the investment
cost: if this cost is suﬃciently low (high), a preemptive (simultaneous) equilib-
rium occurs.3 Furthermore, we prove that the minimal demand level triggering
the optimal asset replacement increases with uncertainty for both ﬁrms, despite
1T oo u rb e s tk n o w le d g e ,t h ep r o d u c tm a r k e ts t r u c t u r ei na2 - p la y e rg a m ei se x p li c i t ly
modeled only by Kulatilaka and Perotti [13], and Perotti and Rossetto [17].
2Other strategic real options models in continuous time include Williams [24], Grenadier
[8], Lambrecht and Perraudin [14], Décamps and Mariotti [2], Perotti and Rossetto [17], and
Mason and Weeds [16]. A discrete time analysis of a strategic real options exercise is presented,
next to Kulatilaka and Perotti [13], by Smit and Ankum [21], whereas Reinganum [18], and
Fudenberg and Tirole [6] provide the game-theoretical foundations within a deterministic
framework.
3Therefore, the type of equilibrium can easily be aﬀected by e.g. the authority. A recent
rule imposed by Germany’s telecoms regulator enabling six companies which acquired the
third generation mobile-phone licenses to share the costs of building a new infrastructure may
s e r v ea sa ne x a m p leo fs u c ha na c t i o n .S e e The Economist, June 9th 2001.
3the strategic eﬀect encouraging earlier investment of the ﬁrst mover (leader).
This results also holds for the case in which the ﬁrms have to decide when to
start up production. Moreover, we show that the expected timing of replace-
ment increases with uncertainty. Finally, we analyze the probability of asset
replacement within a given time interval. It turns out that the replacement
probability decreases with uncertainty for time intervals that include the opti-
mal time to invest in the deterministic case. For shorter intervals there are two
opposite eﬀects which leads to a humped relationship between uncertainty and
the probability of replacement (cf. Sarkar [19]).
The model is presented in Section 2 and the value functions as well as
replacement thresholds are derived in Section 3. Section 4 contains the descrip-
tion of the equilibria and in Section 5 the eﬀect of uncertainty on replacement
thresholds is determined. In Section 6 the decision to start production in a new
market is analyzed. Section 7 examines how these results can be translated into
conclusions with respect to replacement timing, and Section 8 concludes.
2 Framework of the Model
Consider a risk-neutral ﬁrm that has an investment opportunity to replace
its existing production facility with a technologically superior one. The ﬁrm
operates in a duopoly, in which, in line with basic microeconomic theory, the
following inverse linear demand function holds
pt = At − Qt, (1)
pt is the price of a non-durable good/service oﬀered by the ﬁrm and can be
interpreted as the instantaneous cash ﬂow per unit sold, At is a measure of
t h es i z eo ft h ed e m a n da n dQt is the total amount of the good supplied to the
market at a given instant.4 Uncertainty in demand is generated by a geometric
Brownian motion
dAt = αAtdt + σAtdwt, (2)
which is deﬁned on a ﬁltered probability space (Ω,F,F,P),w h e r eα is the
instantaneous drift parameter, σ is the instantaneous standard deviation, dt
is the time increment and dwt is the Wiener increment. The other ﬁrm is
identical to the ﬁrst, both are proﬁt-maximizers and compete in quantities (à
la Cournot).5
The initial constant marginal cost of supplying a unit of the good is
K and implementing the new production facility reduces this cost from K to
k. In order to start using the new technology, Firm i, i ∈{ 1,2},h a st oi n c u r
an irreversible cost I. Simple algebraic manipulation results in the following
4Introducing a linear demand function is not crucial for our results but allows for obtaining
anal yticalexpressions for the optimalinvestment threshol ds and the ﬁrms’ val ues.
5Quantity competition yields the same output as a two-stage game in which the capacities
are chosen ﬁrst and, subsequently, the ﬁrms are competing in prices (see Tirole [23], p. 216).
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where superscript 1 (0)i nπ
ij
t indicates which ﬁrm replaced (did not replace)
its production facility. It is seen immediately that
π10 >π 11 >π 00 >π 01. (7)
L e tu sc o n s i d e rt h ev a l u eo fF i r mi before replacement and denote it by V .7
Using standard dynamic programming methodology (see Dixit and Pindyck [4])










t denotes the instantaneous proﬁt ﬂow before replacement. If the ﬁrm
replaces its production facility ﬁrst, π
0j
t is equal to π00
t (see (3)). If the other ﬁrm
has already implemented the new technology, π
0j
t equals π01
t (cf. (5)). Solving




















PV of expected cash ﬂow
, (9)
where C is a constant and β is the positive root of the following equation (cf.
Dixit and Pindyck [4])8
1
2
σ2β (β − 1) + αβ − r =0 . (10)
From (9) it can be seen that there are two components contributing to the
value of the ﬁrm. The ﬁrst component corresponds to the value of the option
to replace the production facility. The remainder of the LHS of (9) reﬂects
the present value of the expected cash ﬂow given that the ﬁrm produces with
existing technology for ever. Convexity of the value of the ﬁrm in At implies that
a ﬁnite valuation is obtained only if the condition r − 2α − σ2 > 0 is satisﬁed.
6We assume that K ￿ A0, so that the probability weighted discount factor associated
with the event {At < 2K − k} equals zero. Waiving this assumption would not contribute to
our results and would be done at the expense of explicit analytical formulae for the optimal
investment thresholds (cf. Dixit and Pindyck [4] p. 191).
7Since the ﬁrms are identical, we omit subscripts i, j to simplify notation.
8Note that the boundary condition V (0) = 0 implies that the negative root of (10) can be
ignored.
53 Value Functions and Replacement Thresholds
In this section we establish the value of the ﬁrms and their optimal re-
placement thresholds. Consider the case of the ﬁrm that replaces as second
(follower). Since the other ﬁrm (leader) has already replaced its production fa-
cility, the follower’s replacement decision is not aﬀected by the result of strategic
interactions (the follower chooses its optimal threshold as if the roles of the ﬁrms
are preassigned). From (5) and (6) it is obtained that the value of the follower
at t<T F,w h e r eTF is the stochastic time of replacing the production facility


















2 e−r(s−TF)ds − I
￿￿
,
The ﬁrst row of (11) is the expected discounted cash ﬂow received until
replacement. At TF the follower makes the replacement and from now on pro-
duces against a lower marginal cost k. The expected discounted cash ﬂow after
replacement is captured by the second row of (11).
In investment problems of this type (cf. Dixit and Pindyck [4]) a thresh-
old value of At exists at which the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between investing and
refraining from investment. Analogously, the value of the ﬁrm is maximized as
soon as replacement of the production facility takes place at this realization of
At.9 To derive the optimal replacement threshold we apply the value-matching




























9r (K − k)
4
9 (K − k)
(r − α). (14)
9The case where immediate investment is optimalsince A0 exceeds the optimalrepl acement
threshold (as deﬁned here) is analyzed in Section 4.
10The value matching condition equalizes the value of the ﬁrm before the replacement
(therefore including the replacement option), as in (9), with the value after the replacement net
of the associated sunk cost. Upon observing that the value after the replacement corresponds














condition (12) is obtained. Condition (13) is obtained by taking ﬁrst derivatives of (12).
6Note that the optimal threshold (14) is increasing in uncertainty and in the
wedge r−α.11 Now we are able to deﬁne the optimal time of replacement made
by the follower as




The value of the follower can now be calculated by substituting C derived from
(12) and (13) into (9). Derivation of the value functions of the leader and in
case of simultaneous replacement can be performed in an analogous way.
The relevant results are reported in Table 1 (below). The ﬁrst row cor-
responds to the case of the follower. Its value consist of two components: cash
ﬂow from the existing production asset plus the option to replace it with a cost-
eﬃcient facility. This option-like component is a product of the future value of
the incremental cash ﬂow (at the replacement time) and the stochastic discount
factor. The value of the leader (second row) is determined for the moment at
which the leader replaces its asset.12 It reﬂects the expected net present value of
cash ﬂow based on the marginal cost k reduced by the discounted future value
of cash ﬂow lost due to the follower’s replacement (cf. (7)). The value of the
ﬁrm when the simultaneous replacement is made optimally (third row) has a
structure closely related to the one of the follower and is equal to the expecta-
tion of the present value of cash ﬂow based on the current production facility
plus the discounted expectation of the change in cash ﬂow resulting from the
future simultaneous asset replacement of both ﬁrms. Immediate simultaneous
investment (last row) corresponds to the net present value of cash ﬂow when
both ﬁrms produce at the marginal cost k.
4 Equilibria
Since both ﬁrms are ex ante identical, it is natural to consider symmetric
replacement strategies and assume the endogeneity of the ﬁrms’ roles, i.e. that
it is not determined beforehand which ﬁrm will be the ﬁrst to replace. There are
two types of equilibria that can occur under this choice of strategies. We start
by presenting the preemptive equilibrium which is followed by a description of
the simultaneous equilibrium.
11Increasing wedge r − α has also an indirect eﬀect via increasing β but that eﬀect is
dominated.
12Such formulation is convenient while formulating the optimal investment strategies. For
the same reason, immediate simultaneous replacement is also of interest.
7[insert Table 1]
84.1 Preemptive Equilibrium
The ﬁrst type of equilibrium is a preemptive equilibrium where Firm i is
the leader and Firm j is the follower.13 Figure 1 (below) depicts the payoﬀs
associated with the preemptive equilibrium. Let us deﬁne AP to be the smallest
root of
ξ (At)=V L (At) − V F (At). (16)




payoﬀ of the leader is higher than the payoﬀ of the follower (cf. Figure 1), each




In the search for equilibrium we reason backwards in terms of the values of At
(note that Equation (2) does not imply that At increases monotonically over
time). At AF the ﬁrms are indiﬀerent between being the leader and the follower.
H o w e v e r ,f o ras m a l l e rv a l u eo fAt ,s a ya tAF − ε, the leader’s payoﬀ is higher
than the payoﬀ of the follower. This implies that (without loss of generality)
Firm i has an incentive to be the ﬁrst investor there. Firm j anticipates this
and would invest at AF −2ε. Repeating this reasoning we reach an equilibrium
in which Firm i invests at AP and Firm j waits until demand exceeds AF.
Note that if both ﬁrms invest at AP with probability one, they end
up with the low payoﬀ V J(AP,A P) (see Figure 1). At At = AP simultaneous
investment is not proﬁtable because demand is insuﬃcient. Therefore, as in the
seminal work Fudenberg and Tirole [6], the ﬁrms use mixed strategies in which
the expected payoﬀ is equal to the payoﬀ of the follower (let us recall that the
roles of the ﬁrms are not predetermined and the ﬁrms are risk-neutral). The
ﬁrms are identical, so that they both have equal probability of becoming leader
or follower. As in Huisman and Kort [11] it can be shown that for At ∈
￿
AP,A F￿
the probability of a ﬁrm to become leader, PL (or follower, PF)e q u a l s




where p(At), being the probability of investment at the demand level At,e q u a l s
p(At)=
V L (At) − V F (At)
V L (At) − V J (At)
. (18)
Consequently, since all probabilities add up to one, from (17) it follows that the
probability of joint investment leading to the low payoﬀ V J (At) is
p(At)
2−p(At).
If At <A P, the leader payoﬀ curve lies below the follower curve which
implies that it is optimal for both ﬁrms to refrain from investment. For At = AP,
the leader and the follower values are equal. Therefore (17) and (18) yield
the probability of being the leader (or follower) equal to 1
2. The probability
of simultaneous investment at At = AP is therefore equal to zero. The leader
invests at the moment that At = AP, which is the smallest solution of V L (At)=
13For a formal treatment of preemptive equilibria, see Fudenberg and Tirole [6] and Huisman
and Kort [11].
9V F (At), and the follower waits until AF is reached. If the stochastic process
starts at A0 >A P, the optimal investment behavior is to apply the mixed
strategy described by (17) and (18), thus both ﬁrms invest with probability
p(A0). In this case, according to (17) and (18), p(A0) > 0 since the payoﬀ
of the leader exceeds the payoﬀ of the follower. This makes the probability
of investing jointly, and ending up with a low payoﬀ of V J (A0,A 0), become
positive.



































Figure 1. The values of the leader, V L, optimal simultaneous replacement, V S,
and early simultaneous replacement, V J, relative to the value function of the follower,
V F, for the set of parameter values: K =2 ,k=0 ,r=0 .05,α =0 .015,σ=0 .1,
and I =6 0 . For A0 <A P the set of input parameters results in a preemptive
replacement at AP (leader) and AF (follower).
4.2 Simultaneous Equilibrium
Another type of outcome that can occur in the analyzed real option game is
the simultaneous replacement equilibrium. In such a case, the ﬁrms replace their




No ﬁrm has an incentive to deviate from this equilibrium since the payoﬀ of this
strategy exceeds all other payoﬀs.14 A graphical illustration of the simultaneous
equilibrium is depicted in Figure 2 below.
14Of course, the payoﬀs resulting from the preemptive equilibrium in Section 4.1 may be
lower than those associated with the optimal joint replacement. However, the occurrence of
the preemptive equilibrium, as in Section 4.1, is due to the fact that such values of At exist
that the corresponding leader payoﬀ exceeds the value from the joint replacement strategy.
It is the lack of coordination among the ﬁrms (with possible transfer of excess value) that
leads to ex post Pareto-ineﬃcient outcomes. In the case of the simultaneous equilibrium the
payoﬀ of the leader never exceeds the payoﬀ from joint optimal replacement and therefore the
preemptive equilibrium, while still existent, is Pareto-dominated (see Fudenberg and Tirole
[6])




































Figure 2. The values of the leader, V L, optimal simultaneous replacement, V S,
and early simultaneous replacement, V J, relative to the value function of the follower,
V F, for the set of parameter values: K =2 ,k=0 ,r =0 .05,α =0 .015,σ=0 .1,
and I =1 2 0 . The set of input parameters results in the optimality of a simultaneous
replacement at AS.
The occurrence of a particular type of equilibrium is determined by the




such that V L (At) >VS (At), (19)
i.e. when for some At it is more proﬁtable to become the leader than to replace
production facilities simultaneously. Otherwise simultaneous replacement is the
Pareto-dominant equilibrium. Proposition 1 implies that ﬁrms replace their
production facilities simultaneously if the investment cost is suﬃciently high.
Proposition 1 Au n i q u eI∗ exists such that ∀I>I ∗ simultaneous replacement
is the Pareto-dominant equilibrium.
Proof. See Appendix.
This proposition is an important result with respect to the comparison
between the real option exercise game with proﬁt uncertainty and the situa-
tion where the ﬁrms face market uncertainty. In the ﬁrst case the occurrence
of either of the equilibria does not depend on the irreversible cost associated
with the investment decision (see Huisman and Kort [11]). This results from
the fact that the optimal threshold under proﬁt uncertainty is proportional to
investment cost I. This proportionality is a consequence of a multiplicative way
in which uncertainty enters the proﬁt function. Conversely, introducing mar-
ket uncertainty via linking proﬁt functions to a Cournot model results in the
optimal threshold being no longer proportional to I. Therefore, the resulting
equilibrium regions depends on the sunk cost.15
15In general, the investment cost aﬀects the boundaries of the equilibrium regions. There-
fore, the lack of such a relationship in a proﬁt uncertainty model is rather a coincidence than
ar u l e .
115 Uncertainty and Asset Replacement Thresh-
olds
First, we investigate the impact of volatility on the optimal asset replace-
ment thresholds of the follower and for simultaneous replacement. In these cases















so that the optimal replacement thresholds of the follower and in case of
simultaneous replacement increase in uncertainty.
The impact of volatility on the production facility replacement threshold
of the leader requires an additional analysis. Let us set the marginal cost k is to




,w h e r eAP is the smallest root of ξ (At)=0 . To ﬁnd out the
eﬀect of market uncertainty on AP, we calculate the derivative of ξ (At) with
respect to σ. The change of (16) resulting from a marginal increase in σ2 can




























∂(σ2) directly measures the inﬂuence of uncertainty on the






∂(σ2) reﬂects the impact
on the net beneﬁt of being the leader of the fact that the follower replacement
threshold increases with uncertainty.













Therefore, at ﬁrst sight, the joint impact of both eﬀects is ambiguous. (23)
represents the simple value of waiting argument: if uncertainty is large, it is more
16For the majority of intangible/information products the marginal cost of a unit of
good/service is negligible (cf. Shapiro and Varian [22]).
12valuable to wait for new information before replacing the existing production
facility (cf. Dixit and Pindyck [4]) As we have just seen, this also holds for
the follower. The implication for the leader of the follower replacing later is
that the leader has a cost advantage for a longer time. This makes an earlier
replacement of the leader potentially more beneﬁcial. This eﬀect is captured
by (24), which can thus be interpreted as an increment in the strategic value of
becoming the leader vs. the follower resulting from the delay in the follower’s
implementation of the superior technology. Obviously, the latter eﬀect is not
present in the monopolistic/perfectly competitive markets, where the impact of
uncertainty is unambiguous.
It is possible to show that the direct eﬀect captured by (23) dominates,
irrespective of the values of the input parameters.
Proposition 2 When uncertainty in the product market increases, the thresh-
old value of the demand at which the leader replaces its production facility in-
creases, too.
Proof. See Appendix.
From Proposition 2 it can be concluded that the leader threshold re-
sponds to volatility in a qualitatively similar way as a non-strategic threshold,
i.e. it increases with uncertainty. The reason for this result is the following.
First, in our model we introduced the possibility to postpone the replacement
of the production facility. Increased uncertainty raises the proﬁtability of re-
placement (because the follower replaces later), however, the value of the option
to wait rises even more. Second, uncertainty could be beneﬁcial for earlier re-
placement because of the convex shape of the net gain function, resulting in a
power option-like type of payoﬀ (Kulatilaka and Perotti [13]). Then, while per-
forming a mean preserving spread, downside losses are more than compensated
by upside gains. However, unlike the two-period framework of Kulatilaka and
Perotti [13], in our continuous-time model the net gain function is always linear
in the stochastic variable At. If the leader invests, the proﬁt ﬂow π00 is replaced
by the proﬁt ﬂow π10, and it is clear from (3) and (4) that π10 − π00 is linear.
T h es a m eh o l d sf o rt h ef o l l o w e ri n v e s t m e n t( π11 −π01 linear) and simultaneous
investment (linearity of π11 − π00). To see whether the convexity argument
could also work here, in Section 6 we consider the decision to start production.
In this case the ﬁrms are not active initially and can start up production only
upon investing. Consequently, the net gain ﬂows for the leader and the follower
are convex in At.
6 Decision to Start Production
Consider two ﬁrms having a possibility to start production in a new market
where there is no incumbent. The new market assumption implies, in contrast
with Sections 3-4, that the ﬁrms can only start realizing proﬁts after incurring
13as u n kc o s tI. It still holds that demand follows the stochastic process (2).
Without loss of generality the marginal cost of a unit of output after starting
production is set to k =0 .
First, we calculate the optimal threshold of the follower to start pro-





I (r − 2α − σ2). (25)




The optimal follower threshold (25) exists only for σ2 <r−2α. For a relatively
high degree of uncertainty, i.e. for σ2 >r−2α (which corresponds to β ∈ (1,2]),
the follower will never start production since for such levels of uncertainty the
value of the option to invest always exceeds the net present value of investment.





(3r − 4α)I (27)
(for a derivation see Appendix). (27) corresponds to the maximal value of AFN
provided that it is ﬁnite. Therefore, even if the correct estimate of uncertainty
is unavailable to the corporate decision maker, it is still known that the invest-




is never optimal. In such a case the
optimal investment problem is solved by calculating the uncertainty implied by
the threshold AFNlim. Subsequently, the decision maker can decide whether the
true level of uncertainty is more likely to lie below or above the implied value.
Now, let us deﬁne τ to be the moment at which the leader starts pro-



















r−2α−σ2 − I if At >A FN.
(28)






















r−2α−σ2 − I if Aτ >A FN.
(29)
From (28) and (29) it is obtained that indeed the leader and follower values
are convex in At. The threshold of the leader is the smallest solution of the
following equation


















14The impact of uncertainty on the threshold of the leader is not straight-
forward. Similar as in the model with the ﬁrms initially competing on the
product market, there are two eﬀects: the eﬀect of the waiting option and of the
strategic option. Let us denote V LN (At) − V FN(At) by ξ





























Uncertainty aﬀects the magnitude of each of the mentioned eﬀects via parameter
β, as in Section 5, and via an eﬀective discount rate, r − 2α − σ2.T h e l a t t e r
contribution results from convexity of the proﬁt function, i.e. its proportionality
to the square of the underlying stochastic variable At (see (29)).
After substituting the functional forms of V LN (At) and V FN(At) into
ξ
N (At) and calculating the derivative explicitly, the following result is obtained.
Proposition 3 The threshold value of the demand at which the leader starts
production increases in uncertainty.
Proof. See Appendix.
Analogous to the follower case, there exists a critical level of uncertainty,
σ2 = r − 2α, above which it is optimal for the leader never to invest. In the
limit, where σ2 → r−2α, the leader threshold is the smaller root of the equation

















The conclusion is that also in the case of a new market, uncertainty
raises the threshold levels of market demand at which it is optimal for ﬁrms to
invest. Moreover, the resulting convexity of the payoﬀ functions not only does
not decrease the threshold of the ﬁrms but also results in a subset of parameters
for which no replacement is optimal.
7 Uncertainty and Replacement Timing
Until now we analyze the impact of uncertainty and strategic interactions
on the optimal replacement threshold of the ﬁrm. Although threshold values
and timing have a lot to do with each other, it cannot be concluded in general
that the relation between the two is monotonic (cf. Sarkar [19]). In this section
we investigate the relationship between uncertainty, optimal threshold, expected
timing of replacement and the probability with which the threshold is reached
within a time interval of a given length.












denotes the optimal replacement threshold as a function of un-
certainty. We note that expectation (33) tends to inﬁnity for σ2 → 2α and does




















The expected timing of replacement increases in uncertainty due to two eﬀects.
First, for any given threshold, the associated expected ﬁrst passage time is
increasing in uncertainty (cf. the ﬁrst component of the RHS of (34)). Second,
for a ﬁxed level of uncertainty, an increase in the optimal investment threshold
leads to an increase in the expected time to reach (cf. second component of
RHS of (34)). Based on (34) it can be concluded that whenever the threshold
goes up due to more uncertainty, it also holds that the expected time to replace
the production facility increases.
An alternative approach to measure the impact of uncertainty on the
timing of replacement is to look at the probability with which the threshold is
reached within a time interval of a given length, say τ. Contrary to the expected
ﬁrst passage time, this approach does not impose any restrictions on the values
of σ. The probabilities of optimal asset replacement within a given interval are
particularly useful when this interval coincides with a budgeting period.19
After substituting y =l nA∗


































where T denotes the time to reach the threshold and Φ is the standard normal
cumulative density function. As already pointed out in Sarkar [19], the deriv-
ative
∂P(T<τ)
∂σ does not have an unambiguous sign and it can thus be shown
17For a derivation of the probability distribution of the ﬁrst passage time see Harrison [9]
for a formal exposition and Dixit [3] for a heuristic approach.
18Increasing σ2 beyond 2α implies that the probabilities of surviving without reaching the
threshold before a given time do not fall suﬃciently fast for longer hitting times (moreover,
the probability that the process will reach the barrier in inﬁnity is still positive). Since the
expectation is the sum of the product of the ﬁrst passage times and their probabilities, an
insuﬃcient decay in the survival probabilities (without reaching the threshold) results in the
divergence of the expectation.
19For a discussion of the capital budgeting process at a corporate level see Kaplan and
Atkinson [12], Ch. 14 and Bower [1], Ch. 1-3.
16that, in general, uncertainty can aﬀect the probability of reaching the threshold
within a given time in both directions.
First, we illustrate the relationship between the ﬁrst passage time,
volatility and related probabilities for the follower threshold since this threshold
is unaﬀected by the strategic considerations. Subsequently, we present results of
simulations related to the threshold of the leader. In this part we use the model
of Section 3-4. The results for the decision to start production are qualitatively
similar and are not reported.




























Figure 3. The cumulative probability of reaching the optimal follower replacement
threshold as a function of demand uncertainty (left) and time (right) for the set of
parameter values: At =4 ,r=0 .05,α =0 .015,K=3 ,k=0and I =6 0 .
From Figure 3 (left) it can be concluded that the form of relationship between
uncertainty and the probability of reaching the threshold depends on the time
to reach. For high values of the time to reach, the cumulative probability of
reaching the threshold decreases in volatility since the probability mass of the
ﬁrst passage time density function moves to the right (cf. (34)). For low values
of τ the probability of reaching the threshold ﬁrst increases due to a spread in the
probability mass. However, for high volatilities the eﬀect of the probability mass
shifting to the right dominates, so that the cumulative probability of reaching
the threshold becomes smaller again.
Figure 3 (right) indicates that the probability of reaching the follower
threshold always increases with the time interval which is of course trivial. The
relevant observation is that this relationship is more pronounced for low levels
of market uncertainty. This results from the fact that in the absence of un-
certainty the optimal investment trigger is reached at a speciﬁed point in time
with probability 1 and the corresponding cumulative density function is a heav-
iside step function. Increasing volatility spreads the probability mass around
the point corresponding to the deterministic case. This leads to an increased
cumulative chance of reaching the trigger at points in time situated to the left
of this speciﬁed point in time, while the reverse is true for the point situated
to the right. This inﬂuences the shape of the cumulative distribution function
whose slope decreases in uncertainty.







































Figure 4. The derivative with respect to market uncertainty of the cumulative
probability of reaching the optimal follower threshold as a function of uncertainty itself
(left) and time (right) for the set of parameter values: At =4 ,r=0 .05,α=0 .015,
K =3 ,k=0and I =6 0 .
Figure 4 allows for a closer inspection of the relationship between the timing
of asset replacement and uncertainty. From the left window it can be concluded
that, irrespective from the time to reach, there exists a level of uncertainty
beyond which a further increase in uncertainty reduces the probability of the
optimal asset replacement. This relationship is inverse, i.e. the longer the time
interval, the lower level of uncertainty for which its further growth reduces the
probability of the optimal replacement. For example, using the parameters from
Figure 4 we can conclude that for τ =5this critical value of uncertainty, σ,
is 0.234,f o rτ =1 0it is only 0.118,w h e r e a sf o rτ =2 0increased uncertainty
always reduces the cumulative probability of optimal investment.
The right window of Figure 4 indicates that the probability of the op-
timal replacement increases in uncertainty for a suﬃciently small time to reach
and decreases for a suﬃciently large time. Moreover, the derivative of the prob-
ability of reaching the optimal threshold changes its sign only once. Finally,
Figure 4 (right) allows for the conclusion that the time to reach beyond which
uncertainty negatively aﬀects the probability of optimal replacement is, again,
negatively related to its level. For σ =0 .1 the time to reach which separates the
areas of a positive and a negative relationship reaches the value of 11.46 years,
for σ =0 .2 it equals 5.87 years, while for σ =0 .3 it drops to 4.06 years.
Despite the presence of strategic eﬀects, the probability of asset replace-
ment of the leader responds to changes in uncertainty and time to reach in a
similar way as the corresponding probabilities of the follower. For low σ’s the
probability of investing increases more rapidly with the length of the time in-
terval than for high σ’s. Moreover, for high τ’s the probability of replacing the
existing asset is always decreasing in uncertainty, while for low τ’s the proba-
bility behaves in a non-monotonic way.









18as the point in time at which the replacement threshold A∗ is reached in the
deterministic case. Then it holds that for τ<τ ∗ the probability of reaching
the investment threshold A∗ before τ increases in uncertainty at a relatively low
level of uncertainty and decreases for a relatively high level, whereas for τ>τ∗
the probability of reaching the optimal threshold before τ always decreases in
uncertainty.
Proof. See Appendix.
The results of simulations concerning the relationship between uncer-
tainty, ﬁrst passage time and probabilities of reaching the leader threshold are
presented in Table 2 below.
σ τ =1 τ =2 τ =5 τ =1 0 τ =1 5 τ =2 0
0.05 0.06 2.39 24.11 54.32 71.17 80.97
0.10 0.61 5.93 26.79 47.94 59.70 67.24
0.20 0.62 5.14 21.00 36.47 45.10 50.72
0.30 0.46 3.97 16.50 28.66 35.31 39.55
0.40 0.39 3.30 13.57 23.22 28.29 31.39
0.50 0.36 2.93 11.55 19.23 23.02 25.21
Table 2. The cumulative probability (in percentages) of reaching the optimal
leader replacement threshold as a function of demand uncertainty for the set parameter
values: At =2 ,r =0 .05 ,α =0 .015,k=0 , K =3and I =6 0 . The optimal
timing of replacement in the deterministic case equals τ∗ =9 .36.
We conclude that, while under increased uncertainty the threshold in-
creases, the probability that the ﬁrm optimally replaces its production facility
within a given amount of time decreases when this amount of time is suﬃciently
large. However, when this amount of time is suﬃciently low there are two con-
tradictory eﬀects. On the one hand, this probability goes up because higher
volatility enhances the chance of reaching a particular threshold early. On the
other hand, this probability eventually goes down with uncertainty because then
the eﬀect of the probability mass shifting to the right begins to dominate.
8C o n c l u s i o n s
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the ﬁrm’s decision to replace an
existing production facility with a technologically superior one. In order to
capture the eﬀect of strategic interactions among the ﬁrms operating in an im-
perfectly competitive and uncertain environment we model the product market
as a Cournot duopoly with a stochastic demand parameter. Such a formulation
results in the payoﬀ functions being convex in the stochastic demand parameter.
19We determine the type of equilibria of the real option game played by
the ﬁrms. We show that it is optimal for the ﬁrms to replace their production fa-
cilities sequentially when the associated cost is relatively low and simultaneously
otherwise.
Furthermore, we ﬁnd that the direct eﬀect of uncertainty (related to
the waiting option) on the replacement threshold of the leader is always larger
than the indirect eﬀect (strategic option) resulting from the delay in the follower
decision to replace its production facility. Consequently, irrespective from the
type of equilibrium, increasing uncertainty always raises the level of demand
triggering the optimal replacement. This result also holds in case of the decision
to start production rather than the decision to replace.
Moreover, it can be concluded that the expected timing of replacement
increases with uncertainty. This result supports the view that uncertainty delays
the implementation of the new technology, even in the presence of strategic
interactions combined with a convex proﬁt function.
We also look at the probability of replacing the production facility
within a certain time interval. Here, the point in time at which replacement
is made optimally in the deterministic case plays a crucial role. For an interval
that contains this point in time, the probability of optimal replacement within
this time interval decreases with uncertainty. However, if this time interval is
that short that the optimal replacement time in the deterministic case lies out-
side this interval, then the replacement probability goes up with uncertainty
when uncertainty is low while it goes down otherwise.
9 Appendix
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 . First, let us deﬁne
ζ (At)=V S (At) − V L (At). (37)

































for At ≤ AF. From (19) it follows that if on the interval [A0,A F] the minimum
of ζ (At) is smaller than zero, a preemptive equilibrium occurs. Otherwise, the
ﬁrms replace their production facilities simultaneously.20 The existence of a
negative minimum of ζ (At) depends, as mentioned above, on the value of the





































20Strictly speaking, the equilibrium with sequential entry still exists in this case but is
Pareto-dominated by the simultaneous entry equilibrium (cf. Fudenberg and Tirole [6]).
20It is suﬃcient to show that
dζ (At)
dI


































Subsequently, we substitute for At in (41) the expression (39) for A∗∗. Complex-





At=A∗∗ is positive for β ∈ [1,∞),α∈ R,r∈ (α,∞),











































Since the threshold of the leader is equal to AP,a n dAP is the smallest root of
the concave function ξ (At), we know that
∂ξ(At)
∂At
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
At=AP
> 0. (43)




￿ ￿ ￿ ￿
At=AP
> 0 (44)
to conclude that the replacement threshold of the leader is increasing in uncer-
tainty (decreasing in β). Moreover, we know from (42) that
dξ(At)
dβ changes its



















> 0 iﬀ At <A ∗. (46)




At=AP > 0. In






























































21An analytical proof is again not possible but numerically it can be shown that








Limiting value of the optimal threshold to start production (follower).











































=2 ( r − 2α) lim
σ2→r−2α
r − 2α − σ2
−3







Applying l’H￿ opital yields
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2 (r − 2α)
￿2 +2 r(r − 2α) − α + 1
2 (r − 2α)+2r
=
−4(r − 2α)




￿ ￿2α − 3
2r
￿ ￿ − α + 1
2 (r − 2α)+2 r
.











− α + 1








=3 r − 4α. (49)
22Substituting (49) into (48) yields the desired result.
Limiting value of the optimal threshold to start production (leader).
To obtain the leader’s limiting threshold, we are interested in the form of func-
tion ξ
N when σ2 tends to r−2α. For any At ∈
￿
0,A FN￿
we have (cf. (28), (29)
and ξ













































































r − 2α − σ2 . (51)




























r − 2α − σ2 .
Application of l’H￿ opital rule yields










































































































Consequently, after substituting (54) into (51), we obtain the formula for the


















P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 . First we substitute the functional forms of the








































Denote the smallest solution of ξ
N (At)=0by APN.S i n c e APN cannot be
explicitly derived, we proceed as follows. First, we consider a particular point
A>A PN. Second, we show that
dξN(At)
d(σ2) is negative for all At ∈ (A,A), where





I (r − 2α − σ2). (57)




> 0 what would imply that A>A PN.A f t e r






















24Since β>2 (recall that for β ≤ 2 no ﬁrm is willing to enter), we know that
2I
β−2 is always positive. Therefore we are interested only in the sign of φ(β).






























is positive which implies that A>
APN. Furthermore, we prove that (56) changes signs twice, i.e. it is positive




,w h e r eA is some realization of At such that A>A,























































(r − 2α − σ2)
2 > 0. (64)




















































which implies that there exists only one optimum of
dξN(At)
d(σ2) that is diﬀerent
from zero. This result, combined with (65) and (66), implies that
dξN(At)
d(σ2) is
22The result (65) has been derived using the l’H￿ opital and observing that A
2−β
t explodes
in the neighborhood of zero faster than ln At.











































is negative for β ∈ [2,∞),
α ∈ R,r∈ (α,∞) and I ∈ (0,∞). Therefore the only remaining part of the
proof is to show that A <A PN for any vector of input parameters. Since
the explicit analytical forms of A and APN do not exist, we use a numerical
procedure. For any given vector of input parameters (from the domains as in
the preceding part of the proof), we calculate the diﬀerence APN−A and it turns










> 0, we conclude that dAPN
d(σ2) > 0, i.e. the investment threshold of
the leader increases in uncertainty.
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n4 . First, we show that τ∗ is the time to reach
the replacement threshold A∗ in the deterministic case. After observing that
x = αt is the solution to dx = αdt with initial condition x0 =0 , and substituting
x∗ =l nA∗









.F o rt h em o m e n tw ea s s u m et h a tµ = τ∗ irrespective
from σ. Then increasing σ is equivalent to performing a mean preserving spread.











is the density function of the ﬁrst passage time for a
geometric Brownian motion, E [τ] is increasing in σ (cf. (34)) when A∗ is in-






.F o rτ>τ∗, an increase in uncertainty not only
reduces the probability mass to the left of τ via the mean preserving spread
but also because of the mean moving to the right itself. Therefore the eﬀect
of uncertainty on the probability of the replacement decision is unambiguous
in this region and negative. For σ →∞the probability of investing before τ
decreases to zero. The latter conclusion is true since from (35) it is obtained
26that
lim





















































σ→∞A∗ = ∞. (71)
For τ<τ ∗, the two eﬀects work in the opposite direction. As in the previ-
ous case, the mean E [τ] is increasing in uncertainty. Without a change in the
volatility, an increase in the mean would then decrease the probability of replac-
ing the existing production facility. However, increasing uncertainty results in
a greater probability mass being present in the left tail of ϕ(τ). Therefore, the
total eﬀect of increasing uncertainty is ambiguous in this region. However, we
are able to conclude that the probability of investing at a given τ behaves in a
certain non-monotonic way. For σ =0 , there is no probability mass on the in-
terval [0,τ). Therefore an increase in uncertainty initially leads to an increased
probability of investment. For relatively large σ the eﬀect of moving the mean
of the distribution to the right starts to dominate and the probability of asset
replacement falls. For σ →∞the probability of replacing the existing asset
before a given time τ decreases to zero.
Finally, we show that all the thresholds increase in uncertainty monoton-
ically and unboundedly. We already know (from Proposition 2 and 3) that the
optimal replacement thresholds increase in uncertainty monotonically. So now
we only have to prove that the thresholds grow in uncertainty unboundedly. For
the thresholds of the follower and in case of simultaneous replacement it is easy
to observe that
β
β−1 tends to inﬁnity when σ →∞ .23 The replacement thresh-
old of the leader requires slightly more attention.24 We already know that the
leader replaces its asset as soon as the stochastic variable reaches the smallest
























After substituting expression of AF (see Table 1) into (72) and rearranging, we
23For new market model the similar conclusion can be drawn after the substitution of
parameters in the original geometric Brownian motion.
24The unboundedness of the leader threshold in the new market entry can be proven in a














































































































the LHS of (74) approaches zero from above. Now, we are looking for the
solution of
0=m(x)x − n, where ∀x ∈ R++ m(x),n>0, (76)
such that m(x) is tending to zero from above (this is guaranteed by (75))
∀x ∈ R++ when the uncertainty is increasing. Consequently, any solution (so
the smallest one as well) of (76) is tending to inﬁnity. This is equivalent to
lim
β↓1
AP = ∞, (77)
which completes the proof.
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